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Once again this past year, the Fourth Circuit and the federal
courts in Virginia proved inhospitable to antitrust plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs consistently lost on summary judgment and only one
plaintiff survived a motion to dismiss.' The only major develop-
ment in the law in the Fourth Circuit came from the Western
District of Virginia where Judge James C. Turk refused to
recognize the theory of monopoly leveraging under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act.2
* This article addresses federal and state legislative developments and
enforcement activities, and antitrust decisions of the United State Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and state and federal courts of Virginia from
June, 1993 to June, 1994.
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1. See infra Part H.
2. Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Giles Memorial Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California' also benefitted potential defen-
dants and the insurance industry by narrowing the boycott
exception to McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity.4 However, for
those who may have claims for price discrimination based upon
tacit coordination of predatory pricing schemes in oligopolistic
markets, the Supreme Court left the door open when it refused
to adopt a rule of per se non-liability in such cases.5 The Court
did note that it was very unlikely that such claims could
succeed.6
Finally, while federal enforcement agencies were busy issuing
policy statements establishing "antitrust safety zones" in the
health care field, the Virginia Attorney General's Office contin-
ued its enforcement efforts on behalf of consumers. In two in-
stances, the Attorney General's office teamed up with other
states to force settlements!
II. FEDERAL COURT CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Sherman Act Section 1 Conspiracy Issues
1. Section 1 Conspiracy Claims Fare Poorly on Summary
Judgment
Not surprisingly, antitrust plaintiffs continue to have difficul-
ty in the Fourth Circuit pursuing their Sherman Act Section 1'
claims past summary judgment.9 During this past year, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed a South Carolina district court's grant
(W.D. Va. 1994).
3. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
4. Id. at 2900, 2915-16.
5. Id. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578
(1993).
6. Id.
7. See infra Part V.
8. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988).
9. Part II.F.l.b, infra, addresses the viability of plaintiffs' § 1 claims at the
pleading stage. As noted there, antitrust plaintiffs fared slightly better at that pro-
cedural stage.
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of summary judgment in favor of defendant motor carriers. °
Virginia's district courts also rejected on summary judgment the
claims of a durable medical equipment supplier and a media
advertising broker."
In Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp.,' the Fourth Circuit affirmed, in a short unpublished
per curiam opinion, what it considered to be a "thorough and
well reasoned" opinion of the district court granting defendants
summary judgment. 3  Plaintiff Lifschultz Fast Freight, a
freight forwarder, alleged that the defendants, three common
motor carriers, conspired with the Teamsters Union to force
other carriers out of the "less than truckload" (LTL) freight
market. 4 The district court, following the instruction of
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,5
found that the plaintiffs produced no credible evidence to sup-
port their conspiracy theory or to exclude the possibility that
the alleged conspirators acted independently." The court found
the testimony from Lifschultz's primary witnesses too incredible
to support Lifschultz's conspiracy theory.' Additionally, plain-
tiff failed to name any employee of the defendants who was in-
volved in the conspiracy or to provide any evidence of an agree-
ment by defendants to participate in a conspiracy with the
Teamsters Union. 8 The court also found the speculative affida-
vit of plaintiffs expert laughable, noting that it "read more like
10. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 998 F.2d 1009
(4th Cir. 1993), affg per curiam, 805 F. Supp. 1277 (D.S.C. 1992).
11. Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Giles Memorial Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488
(W.D. Va. 1994); Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Advertising, 850 F. Supp.
470 (E.D. Va. 1994).
12. 998 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1993), aftg per curiam, 805 F. Supp. 1277 (D.S.C.
1993).
13. Id.
14. 805 F. Supp: at 1280-81.
15. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Matsushita held that:
[A] plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of [Sherman Act] § 1 must
present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged
conspirators acted independently... Respondents in this case, in other
words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light
of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that
could not have harmed respondents.
Id. at 588 (citation omitted).
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a cheap novel than an economic report." 9 The court found the
"most profound flaw" in Lifschultz's conspiracy theory was that
it simply was not reasonable in light of the record evidence. 0
The district court also dismissed as unsupported
2
'
Lifschultz's allegations of predatory pricing.' The portion of
the market allegedly affected by the predatory pricing scheme
was so small that it could not have had any real effect on com-
petition." Moreover, there was no evidence that the alleged
conspirators could recoup the losses resulting from below cost
pricing because the barriers to entry to LTL trucking were so
low that new entrants would appear as soon as monopoly prices
were charged.' Given this evidence, a conspiracy based on
Lifschultz's theory would not make any economic sense. On this
basis, the court held that defendants were entitled to summary
judgment.'
The defendants in Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v.
Giles Memorial Hospital' were also successful in obtaining
summary judgment from Judge Turk on plaintiffs Sherman Act
Section 1 and 2 claimsY.2  Advanced Health-Care Services
(AHCS), a durable medical equipment (DME) supplier,
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1286.
21. Id. at 1287 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986)).
22. Predatory pricing is "pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the
purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the
long run." Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986); see also Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., discussed infra part II.C.
23. 805 F. Supp. at 1287.
24. Id. at 1287-88. The Supreme Court has indicated that the likelihood of re-
coupment of losses is an important factor in determining predatory pricing. In
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the Court explained:
The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly
power for long enough both to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest
some additional gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly
will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant period of
time, "[t]he predator must make a substantial investment with no assur-
ance that it will payoff." For this reason, there is a consensus among
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful.
475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
25. 805 F. Supp. at 1288.
26. 846 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1994).
27. Id. at 499.
28. As the court noted, "DME consists of canes, crutches, oxygen equipment,
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brought suit against Giles Memorial Hospital and Medserv,
another DME supplier.' Medserv contracted with the hospital
to supply DME to residents of the hospital's service area
through a home DME business located in the hospital."0 The
court had previously dismissed AHCS's numerous federal and
state antitrust claims on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but was reversed by the Fourth
Circuit which set forth the law of the case and remanded for
discovery."'
AHCS alleged that the contract between the hospital and
Medserv constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 After detailed discov-
ery, Judge Turk held that AHCS had failed to prove at least
one element of its claim since it had not produced any signifi-
cant evidence of "adverse, anticompetitive effects" resulting from
the contract between the defendants.' AHCS could not show
that the contract produced a rise in the price of DME, a decline
in quality, or a reduction in the number of firms supplying
DME.' On the contrary, competition was apparently enhanced
by the contract." The court noted that while AHCS might
have been hurt by the increased competition, there was no
evidence that competition in general had been injured. 6 Judge
Turk therefore held that defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on the Section 1 claimY
A plaintiffs Section 1 claim was also dismissed on summary
judgment in Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Advertis-
ing, L.P.' In Thompson, plaintiff Thompson Everett (TE), a
wheelchairs, walkers, hospital beds and other items used by persons recuperating at
home from an accident or illness.&" Id. at 492 n.1.
29. Id. at 492.
30. Id.
31. See Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d
139 (4th Cir. 1990).
32. 846 F. Supp. at 492.
33. Id. at 493.
34. Id.
35. Id. As the court pointed out, '[aifter Home Connections entered the mar-
ket .... [the market became less concentrated... as consumers had a greater
choice of supplies." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 850 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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buyer of broadcast and print media advertising time, brought
suit against representatives of cable television systems (cable
rep firms) that sell advertising time (cable spots) to national
advertisers, challenging their exclusive contractual arrange-
ments with their represented cable systems. 9 Under these
agreements, the cable system operator committed to use the
cable rep firm exclusively in exchange for the cable rep firm's
agreement to make sales of advertising time on the cable
systems' behalf." TE alleged that the exclusive rep contracts
constituted unlawful restraints in violation of Section .4"
The court was unpersuaded by TE's evidence of frequent
business contacts among defendants, joint presentations by
defendants to industry trade groups, and documents indicating
the need to organize the spot cable market.4" It found more
compelling defendants' evidence that exclusive contracts had
been used throughout the advertising industry since the incep-
tion of defendants' respective businesses.' As a result, the
court held there to be insufficient evidence of an unlawful hori-
zontal agreement among defendants.'
The court went on to apply a rule of reason analysis' to the
exclusive distributorship contracts with the cable system opera-
tors.' The court found that the defendant cable rep firms com-
39. Id. at 473.
40. 850 F. Supp. at 472-73.
41. Id. at 473 n.1.
42. Id. at 480.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The parameters of the rule of reason were delineated by Justice Brandeis in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
be attained, are all relevant facts.
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
46. 850 F. Supp. at 480 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977)).
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peted for these exclusive contracts, that the contracts had rea-
sonable termination provisions, that their geographic scope
varied widely, and that they did not restrict output." The
court accepted defendants' procompetitive explanations for the
contracts: to avoid free riding, attract investment capital, and
produce competition within the spot cable industry and with
other advertising vehicles.' Thus, under Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,49 as the vertical, nonprice restrictions
posed by the contracts actually enhanced competition rather
than harmed it, they were "manifestly reasonable,"' and sum-
mary judgment was appropriate.51
2. Section 1 Tying Claim Rejected
Plaintiffs in Advanced Computer Services v. MAI Systems,52
fared no better on the only Section 1 tying claim' ruled upon
this past year. Advanced Computer and other small indepen-
dent service organizations (ISOs) brought suit against MAI, a
manufacturer of minicomputers, alleging that MAI had unlaw-
fully tied the sale of its copyrighted operating system and diag-
nostic software (the tying product) to the sale of maintenance
and repair services for MAI computers (the tied product), there-
by impairing competition in the repair and service market.'
47. Id. at 481-82.
48. Id. at 482.
49. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
50. 850 F. Supp. at 481.
51. Id. at 483.
52. 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
53. Stated simply, a tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product .... ." Northern P.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Four fac-
tors must be shown to prove an illegal tying arrangement under either a per se or
rule of reason theory:
(1) The existence of two separate products; (2) An agreement conditioning
purchase of the tying product upon purchase of the tied product or upon
agreement not to purchase; (3) Seller's possession of sufficient economic
power in the tying product market to restrain competition in tied product
market; and (4) A not insubstantial impact on interstate commerce.
Advanced Computer, 845 F. Supp. at 367-68; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-16, 18-21 (1984); Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen.
Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 683 (4th Cir. 1992); Faulkner Advertising Assoc., Inc. v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 905 F.2d 769, 772-73 (4th Cir. 1990).
54. 845 F. Supp. at 360.
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MAI's software and hardware are not compatible with other
types of minicomputers, and because of the unique nature of
MAI computers and the specialized training required to service
them, purchasers have limited choices in maintenance and
service providers.55 MAI chose to selectively license its copy-
righted software, rather than sell it.'
The court rejected plaintiffs' tying claim because plaintiffs
presented no evidence of explicit agreements conditioning the
purchase of MAI rights to use its software upon the purchase of
MAI service contracts." Moreover, plaintiffs presented no evi-
dence of forcing or coercion by MAI. The court specifically
noted that MAI was entitled to protect its copyright and license
its software to whomever it chose.59 Plaintiffs' tying claim
therefore failed under both the per se rule and rule of
reason.6
B. Sherman Act Section 2 Monopolization Issues
Virginia's federal courts were equally harsh in ruling on
plaintiffs' Sherman Act Section 261 claims as they were on Sec-
tion 1 claims. Not only did they reject plaintiffs' monopolization,
attempted monopolization, and essential facilities claims on
summary judgment, but in clarifying one unsettled area of Sec-
tion 2 jurisprudence, the District Court for the Western District
of Virginia also rejected monopoly leveraging as a viable claim
in this circuit.1
2
55. Id. at 359.
56. Id. at 360.
57. Id. at 368.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 368-69.
60. Id. at 369.
61. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, makes it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
62. See infra. part II.B.2.
830
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1. Attempted Monopolization, Monopolization and Conspiracy
to Monopolize
In Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Giles Memorial
Hospital,' AHCS alleged numerous claims under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act in addition to its Section 1 claims. The claims
were based on the contract between Giles Memorial Hospital
and Medserv, a supplier of DME, to sell DME through their
joint venture, Home Connections.' AHCS's Section 2 claims
included monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspir-
acy to monopolize.'
With respect to the monopolization claim," the court found
unpersuasive the affidavit of AHCS's expert, Dr. Roger Blair,
which stated that Home Connections' market power reached a
peak of 57.8% of the DME market in Giles County.67 The court
noted that Dr. Blair had made several errors," and once they
were corrected, Home Connections' true market share peaked
only at 44.1%, significantly below the established floor of 50%
for showing monopoly power."9 The court also noted that mar-
ket share trends belied AHCS's monopolization claim. For ex-
63. 846 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1994).
64. Id. at 492.
65. Id. at 493-98.
66. The offense of monopolization requires a showing by the plaintiff that the
defendants: (1) possess monopoly power in the particular relevant market; and (2)
have willfully acquired and/or maintained such power in an exclusionary or predatory
manner as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
67. 846 F. Supp. at 494.
68. The court explained the errors as follows:
Dr. Blair made two mistakes in his calculations. First, Dr. Blair calculat-
ed Home Connections' market share based on billed revenue, while calcu-
lating all other suppliers' market shares on collected revenue. Second, Dr.
Blair calculated Home Connections' market share based on revenue from
Giles County residents and from non-Giles County residents, but calculat-
ed other suppliers' market shares based on revenue from Giles County
only.
Id. AHCS did not deny the errors, but argued that the correct measure of market
share was new referrals, not revenues, and pointed to Dr. Blair's opinion that Home
Connections secured over 78% of DME referrals from the defendant hospital. The
court dismissed this argument, noting that the proper geographic market for the
analysis was Giles County, not Giles Memorial Hospital. Id. at 494 n.10.
69. Id. at 493 & n.9, 494.
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ample, Home Connections steadily lost market share to several
other DME suppliers during the relevant period, eventually
leading to its demise."
The court also held that AHCS had not presented sufficient
evidence of exclusionary or predatory conduct by defendants. 1
AHCS claimed that the hospital's discharge planners had
steered its patients needing DME to Home Connections. 2
However, the allegations did not withstand scrutiny in light of
the fact that the hospital used "freedom of choice" forms and
that AHCS did not come forward with a single former Giles
Memorial patient who claimed not to have had a choice."
Since defendants simply benefitted from the competitive advan-
tages available to Home Connections, i.e., "goodwill and confi-
dence engendered by the satisfactory provision of hospital ser-
vices and continuity of care from the hospital to home," the
court granted defendants' summary judgment. 4
AHCS fared no better on its claims for attempted monopoliza-
tion75 and conspiracy to monopolize. 8 The court held that
AHCS failed to establish any of the elements necessary to prove
attempted monopolization, because it presented no direct evi-
dence of specific intent to monopolize.7 AHCS could not satisfy
specific intent through a showing of predatory conduct such as
steering, coercion of doctors or employees by defendants, or
uncompetitively high prices or consistently inferior quality. 8
70. Id. at 494.
71. Id. at 496.
72. Id. at 495.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 495-96.
75. It is generally required that to demonstrate the offense of attempted monopo-
lization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly power. See 3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW $ 820, p. 312 (1978); see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,
113 S. Ct. 884, 890-91 (1993); Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 926 (4th
Cir. 1990); Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d
139, 147 (4th Cir. 1990).
76. "In order to prove a conspiracy to monopolize, 'a plaintiff must show concerted
action, a specific intent to achieve an unlawful monopoly, and commission of an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy." 846 F. Supp. at 497-98 (citing Radford Com-
munity Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150 (4th Cir. 1990)).
77. 846 F. Supp. at 498.
78. Id. at 497.
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Moreover, Home Connections' low market share stymied
AHCS's attempt to establish that there was a "dangerous prob-
ability of success."" Similarly, the court rejected AHCS's con-
spiracy to monopolize claim, finding that there was no signif-
icant probative evidence that defendants intended to engage in
anything other than vigorous competition.'
In Advanced Computer Services v. MAI Systems Corp.,"' the
district court not only granted defendants summary judgment
on plaintiffs' Section 1 claims, but also on their claims of mo-
nopolization.82 The court found that while there was a genuine
factual dispute over MAIs share of the repair and service mar-
ket,8 plaintiffs failed to show that MAI had engaged in any
predatory or anticompetitive acts with a specific intent to mo-
nopolize the relevant market.' Plaintiffs argued that MAI was
guilty of exclusionary conduct through copyright misuse when
MAI attempted to enforce its copyrights by issuing letters to
the plaintiffs advising them to cease and desist loading and
booting its software.' The court was unimpressed, noting that
MAI was within its rights to enforce its valid copyright." In
doing so, it distinguished MAI's conduct from that involved in
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc.87 The court noted that Kodak
attempted to justify its actions with "valid business reasons,"
which the Supreme Court found to raise triable issues of fact,
as opposed to MAIs conclusively valid reason for its ac-
tions-protection of its copyrighted material."
79. Id.
80. 846 F. Supp. at 497-98.
81. 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
82. Id. at 371.
83. Id. at 369. Plaintiffs produced evidence that the defendant's market share was
90%, while MAI claimed that its market share was less than 50%. Id.
84. Id. at 370.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
88. 845 F. Supp. at 370 n.17.
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2. Monopoly Leveraging Theory Rejected in Western District
In a most interesting development this past year, Judge
Turk, sitting on the District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, refused to recognize a claim for monopoly leverag-
ing 9 under Section 2. Judge Turk squarely addressed this is-
sue for the first time in the Fourth Circuit with his ruling in
Advanced Health-Care." There, AHCS claimed that Giles Me-
morial Hospital leveraged its monopoly power in the acute care
services market to gain an unfair competitive advantage for
Home Connections in the DME market by using its power to
obtain exclusive access to patients that needed DME upon dis-
charge.9 1
Judge Turk found more persuasive the reasoning of the Third
and Ninth Circuits in Fineman v. Armstrong World Industries,
Inc.92 and Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,"
which both rejected monopoly leveraging as a viable claim, over
the decisions of the Second and Sixth Circuits in Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.' and Kerasotes Michigan Theatres,
Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc.,95 which embraced monopoly
89. Monopoly leveraging is a theory in which a seller who has a monopoly in one
product uses that monopoly to create a limited monopoly in another product that is
required for the use of the first product. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAW §8.4 (1985); see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Kerasotes Michigan
Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements Inc., 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dis-
missed, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989). But see Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980
F.2d 171, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993); Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1603 (1992).
90. Before remanding Radford Community Hosp., the Fourth Circuit refused to
address the viability of AHCS's claim for monopoly leveraging, saying "[w]e reserve
definitive resolution of that issue for a case in which the issue is squarely presented."
Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d at 149 & n.17; see also M & M Medical Sup-
plies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 981 F.2d 160, 168-69 (4th Cir.
1992) (en banc) ("There will be time enough to evaluate the validity of this as-
sumption after the parties have developed a factual record."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2692 (1993).
91. 846 F. Supp. at 496.
92. 980 F.2d 171, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993).
93. 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
94. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
95. 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989).
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leveraging. Judge Turk explained that "Berkey Photo's leverag-
ing theory does not follow from the text of the Sherman Act
and destroys the distinction between concerted conduct that 're-
strains trade' in section 1 and unilateral conduct that 'monopo-
lizes or attempts to monopolize' in section 2."" In any event,
Judge Turk held that even if monopoly leveraging stated a
claim, in the absence of "some sort of overt conduct such as
steering, Home Connections had no way to 'pull the alleged
lever."97
3. Essential Facilities Doctrine
Two essential facilities claims9" under Sherman Act Section
2 were unsuccessful this past year; one was addressed by the
Fourth Circuit, and the other by Judge Turk in Advanced
Health-Care. The Fourth Circuit decision came in an unpub-
lished per curiam opinion in North Carolina Electric Member-
ship Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co.' In that case, the
court affirmed the district court's directed verdict for the defen-
dant, Carolina Power and Light (CPL). °" The court found that
North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation (NCEMC) had
failed to produce sufficient evidence that CPL had violated
Section 2 by refusing to grant NCEMC access to an essential
facility.101
NCEMC, an organization comprised of sixteen retail electric
cooperatives, filed this suit against CPL in 1977. The suit fol-
lowed after three years of abortive negotiations to purchase
part interest in a CPL generating plant in an attempt to enter
the wholesale power market.1 "a After CPL refused to sell
96. 846 F. Supp. at 496-97 (quoting Fineman, 980 F.2d at 205-06).
97. Id. at 497.
98. The four elements necessary to prove an essential facilities claim are: (1)
control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically
or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facili-
ty to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors. Lau-
rel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc. 924 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 64 (1991) (citing MCI v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. U.S. 891 (1983)).
99. 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 70,264 (4th Cir. 1993).
100. Id. at 70,318.
101. Id. at 70,321.
102. Id. at 70,318-19.
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NCEMC part interest in the plant, NCEMC alleged denial of an
essential facility and sought treble damages of $1.2 billion."
The district court granted CPL a directed verdict, holding that
CPL had no duty to sell NCEMC any interest in one of its
generating plants regardless of whether CPL had a monopo-
ly. 104
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, hold-
ing that, notwithstanding any showing by NCEMC of a CPL
monopoly in the relevant market, NCEMC's claim must fail."°
The court explained that a firm with a lawful monopoly does
not have a general duty to help its competitors,"° except
under the essential facilities doctrine.'" The court found the
second element of the doctrine-the competitor's inability to
practically or reasonably duplicate the facility-to be disposi-
tive." "To satisfy the second element, NCEMC had to show
that, in seeking to generate its own power, it had no 'economi-
cally feasible' alternative to purchasing a part interest in a CPL
generation plant."'" NCEMC clearly failed to prove that it
had no "economically feasible alternative,""0 because NCEMC
could have purchased a part-interest in a generation plant
owned by other large power companies in the region."' In
fact, four years after the negotiations with CPL broke down,
NCEMC actually purchased part interest in a Duke Power
generation plant."' Given this evidence, the court held that a
reasonable jury could not have found that NCEMC had no
feasible alternative to purchasing part of a CPL plant, and af-
firmed the directed verdict in defendant's favor."'
An essential facilities claim was also one of the many claims
made by AHCS in Advanced Health-Care. AHCS claimed that
103. Id. at 70,318.
104. Id. at 70,319.
105. Id. at 70,320.
106. See also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tele. Co., 797 F.2d
370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).






113. Id. at 70,320-21.
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the hospital's rules denying access to inpatients constituted
denial of an essential facility under section 2." However, the
court found that such access was not "essential" since the evi-
dence demonstrated that DME suppliers, even if they did not
have access to the hospital's patients, were consistently gaining
market share."5 In any event, the court noted that AHCS had
neither demonstrated a denial of access, nor had it shown that
it was feasible to permit DME suppliers to solicit patients di-
rectly in their hospital rooms."'
C. Price Discrimination
In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 7 the first primary-line price discrimination case on
which the Supreme Court has ruled in twenty-five years,1 '
the Court affirmed the result reached by the Fourth Circuit,
but disassociated itself from the Fourth Circuit's holding."'
The Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's apparent view
that tacit coordination among oligopolists could not produce
competitive injury in a predatory pricing setting because oligop-
oly pricing does not "provide an economically rational basis" for
recouping predatory losses." The Court declared that it was
not willing to "create a per se rule of nonliability," and, al-
though it considered it unlikely that a predatory pricing scheme
designed to preserve or create a stable oligopoly could injure
consumers, it cautioned that it will not let theory "stand in the
way of liability" in the appropriate case.' With that said,
however, the Court went on to hold that the Liggett Group
(now the Brooke Group) had not provided sufficient evidence to
114. 846 F. Supp. at 498.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
118. Id. at 2586. Twenty-five years ago the Court decided Utah Pie Co. v. Con-
tinental Baking Co. where the Court reviewed the sufficiency of evidence supporting a
jury verdict against three national pie companies that had engaged in various preda-
tory conduct aimed at driving a local frozen pie manufacturer out of business. 386
U.S. 685 (1967).
119. 113 S. Ct. at 2591.
120. Id. at 2591 (quoting Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 1992)).
121. Id.
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create a jury issue under the Robinson-Patman Act, and
afimed the judgment of the trial court and the Fourth Cir-
cuit.n2
Liggett, a manufacturer of cigarettes, alleged that volume
rebates offered by the defendant Brown & Williamson, a com-
petitor, to wholesalers constituted price discrimination that had
a reasonable possibility of injuring competition' in violation
of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act.' Liggett claimed that Brown & Williamson of-
fered the volume rebates as a part of a predatory pricing
scheme to reduce its net prices for generic cigarettes below its
average variable costs." According to Liggett, Brown & Wil-
liamson intended to force Liggett to raise its list price on ge-
neric cigarettes to narrow the price difference between generic
and branded cigarettes." Liggett contended that the resulting
reduction in the gap between branded and generic cigarettes
would restrain the growth of the generic segment of the ciga-
rette market.' Liggett argued that, because the market for
cigarettes was oligopolistic, the restraint in the growth of the
cigarette market would allow Brown & Williamson and the
other cigarette manufacturers to coordinate prices in the
branded market, thereby allowing Brown & Williamson to
maintain its supracompetitive profits on its branded cigarettes
and recoup the losses it suffered as a result of its predatory
122. Id. at 2598.
123. Id. at 2584.
124. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson Patman Act
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quahl-
ty . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
125. The parties agreed that the relevant measure of cost is average variable cost.
Therefore the Court declined to resolve the conflict among the lower courts over the
appropriate measure of cost. 113 S. Ct. at 2587 n.1.
126. Id. at 2582.
127. Id. at 2592.
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below-cost selling of generic cigarettes.' After a 115-day trial,
Liggett won L jury award of $49.6 million in damages which
was trebled to $148.8 million.' However, the district court
ruled that Brown & Williamson was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.3 0
The only issue before the Supreme Court was whether
Liggett had shown injury to competition.'31 The Supreme
Court explained that a primary-line competitive injury under
the Robinson-Patman Act is similar to predatory pricing inju-
ries under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 2 As a result, a
Robinson-Patman plaintiff must establish the same two prereq-
uisites to recovery: the rival company must sell below cost, and
it must have a "reasonable prospect" of being able to recoup its
losses through later monopoly pricing." If recoupment is not
possible and competition is not injured, predation is not action-
able because predatory pricing is generally a boon to consum-
ers."14
The Court went on to explain that recoupment could only
occur where the below-cost pricing would cause the target com-
pany to act as the competitor intended." Once this hurdle is
cleared, however, the plaintiff must still demonstrate that the
predatory scheme would injure competition in the relevant
market by raising prices to supracompetitive levels."3
The Court concluded that Liggett had not carried its burden
on this point.3 7 While Liggett's evidence could have reached
the jury on below-cost pricing," Liggett completely failed to
show that Brown & Williamson had a reasonable prospect of
recapturing its predatory pricing losses through oligopolistic
price coordination given the realities of the market.3 9 More-
128. Id. at 2584.
129. Id. at 2585.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2587.
133. Id. at 2581-89.
134. Id. at 2589.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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over, Liggett failed to show that the market for generic ciga-
rettes shrank as a result of Brown & Williamson's conduct,4 °
that prices increased from these actions, or that there was
tacit coordination among the different corporations in the indus-
try. Finally, since the expert testimony offered by Liggett
was not supported by the facts, it could not sustain the jury's
verdict."
While Justices Stevens, White and Blackmun agreed with the
majority that it was possible to find price discrimination in an
oligopolistic market through parallel pricing, they insisted that
Liggett's evidence was sufficient to support the jury's ver-
dict.'" They reasoned that Brown & Williamson had a reason-
able prospect of success in forcing Liggett to raise its prices in
the generic cigarette market.'
D. Antitrust Injury
The requirement of showing legitimate "antitrust injury,"
derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat," remains a formidable obstacle for
many antitrust plaintiffs. For example, each of the defendants
in Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 47 Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Advertising,
140. Id. at 2593.
141. Id. at 2594.
142. Id. at 2594-95.
143. Id. at 2597-98.
144. Id. at 2603-04.
145. Id. at 2603-04.
146. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). The Court explained the notion of antitrust injury:
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be "the type of loss
that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause."
Id. at 489 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125
n.14 (1969)); see also Abcor Corp. v. AM Intl, Inc., 916 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1990);
Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 720 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1989), modified,
912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990).
147. 998 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1993), affg per curiam, 805 F. Supp. 1277 (D.S.C.
1992).
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L.P.,' and Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Giles Me-
morial Hospital" obtained summary judgment on this issue.
In Lifschultz, the district court, which the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed, found that Lifschultz was still making a profit and only
began losing money after deregulation of the trucking industry
in 1980." Lifschultz could not tie its "injury" to defendants'
alleged conduct.''
In Thompson Everett, the court engaged in a detailed analy-
sis of TE's standing to sue under the antitrust laws.'52 The
court first noted that in order for TE to suffer antitrust injury
from defendants' exclusive distributorship agreements, TE must
be a competitor or consumer in the relevant market, which the
court assumed for purposes of argument was the "spot cable
market."" The court held that TE could not meet the burden
of showing that it competed with defendants as a cable
representation firm because its own evidence demonstrated that
it was a "media buying service" whose primary allegiance was
to advertisers, not to cable systems.' In fact, the court deter-
mined that TE's interests were anticompetitive in that, if defen-
dants were forced to conduct business in the advertisers' best
interests, as did TE, the spot cable advertising industry would
be endangered." TE therefore could not show that it suffered
antitrust injury from defendants' exclusive contracts with cable
operators.'56
Finally, the district court in Advanced Health-Care found that
the entry of Home Connections into the Giles County DME
market made the market more, not less, competitive.'57 It not-
ed that market concentrations were reduced, consumers had
more choice, and there was no evidence that prices rose or
148. 850 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Va. 1994).
149. 846 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1994).
150. 805 F. Supp. at 1288.
151. Id.
152. 850 F. Supp. at 476-77.
153. Id. at 477. In any event, the court did note that TE had not offered any
evidence that the product market should be confined to the narrow "spot cable" in-
dustry instead of the advertising industry as a whole. Id. at 478 n.5.
154. Id. at 478.
155. Id. at 479.
156. Id.
157. 846 F. Supp. at 493.
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quality declined." In short, although AHCS may have been
injured by defendants' entry into the market, AHCS could not
show "harm to the process of competition," entitling defendants
to summary judgment."9
E. Antitrust Immunity Issues
1. McCarran-Ferguson Act Immunity
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,"6 the Supreme
Court significantly narrowed the boycott exception to the anti-
trust exemption provided to domestic insurance companies un-
der the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'' There, nineteen states filed
parens patriae suits in California alleging that four domestic
insurers, two domestic trade associations, and several London-
based reinsurers violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to boy-
cott nonconforming insurers to pressure other domestic insurers
to restrict the terms of coverage of commercial general liability
(CGL) insurance"2 in the United States." Specifically, the
four primary insurers agreed with domestic and/or London
based reinsurers to boycott primary insurers to force them to
eliminate both long-tail insurance" and pollution insurance
products from the domestic CGL market."
The district court dismissed the actions against the
reinsurers on the grounds of McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity,
state action immunity and comity." The Ninth Circuit Court
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
161. 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1988). The
McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts insurance companies from federal antitrust laws if
the companies are covered by state laws. In effect, this has completely exempted
domestic insurance companies from federal antitrust law, because all fifty states have
laws regulating insurance. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW
§ 8.1(a) at 931-32 (1988).
162. The Court defines CGL insurance as insurance that "provides coverage for
third party casualty damage claims against a purchaser of insurance." 113 S. Ct. at
2895 n.1 (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 2895.
164. Long-tail insurance covers risks for which claims may be filed many years
after the occurrence giving rise to such claims.
165. 113 S. Ct. at 2896.
166. Id. at 2899-2900.
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of Appeals reversed, rejecting the insurers' McCarran-Ferguson
Act defense on two grounds: (1) domestic insurers forfeited their
immunity by conspiring with the foreign reinsurers, whose
conduct was not immunized under the Act; 7 and (2) the con-
duct fell within the "boycott" exception'" to the immunity pro-
vided under the Act.'69
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuites ruling that plaintiffs
had sufficiently pled a boycott for the purposes of section 3(b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 70 and that principles of interna-
tional comity did not bar the exercise of Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion by the district court.'7 The Court reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit on the issue of forfeiture of McCarran-Ferguson immunity,
determining that the domestic insurers were engaged in the
business of insurance with the foreign reinsurers and were
therefore immunized if the boycott exception did not apply.72
Justice Souter wrote for a unanimous court on the issue of
immunity" forfeiture by the domestic insurers. According to
Justice Souter, the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the Court's
opinion in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug
Co. ' in applying McCarran-Ferguson immunity as entity
based immunity instead of activity based immunity (i.e., any
time an insurance company acts concertedly with someone notimmunized, that company forfeits their immunity).'74 Immuni-
ty, however, is only lost when a company acts outside the busi-
ness of insurance,75 which the defendant domestic insurers
did not do.
167. Id. at 2900.
168. The boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act states: "Nothing con-
tained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement
to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1013(b) (1994).
169. 113 S. Ct. at 2900.
170. Id. at 2901.
171. Id. at 2910-11.
172. Id. at 2910-11.
173. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
174. 113 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2903.
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The Court unanimously held that all but one of the plaintiffs'
claims constituted a boycott under section 3(b) of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.' The Court split, however, over how to define
a boycott. The majority opinion on this issue, written by Justice
Scalia and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas, defined boycott very narrowly as an
attempt to coerce the target to engage in a transaction on cer-
tain terms by refusing to engage in unrelated transactions until
the target agrees." Therefore, a refusal to engage in related
transactions with the target is not a boycott; rather, it is a
cartelization or concerted agreement to terms. 7 ' According to
Justice Scalia, it is "obviously not a 'boycott'" for reinsurers to
refuse to reinsure coverages on insurance forms until the forms
meet their approval "because the terms of the primary
coverages are central elements of the reinsurance con-
tract-they are what is reinsured."' ° Nevertheless, the allega-
tions of boycott in this case-that reinsurers threatened to
withdraw entirely from reinsuring primary domestic insurers
who wrote insurance on disfavored forms and threatened to
refuse them reinsurance, even on risks written on other
forms-were held sufficient to avoid a motion to dismiss.18'
While Justices Souter, White, Blackmun and Stevens agreed
that plaintiffs' claims were sufficient to support a claim of boy-
cott, they disagreed with Justice Scalia's interpretation of what
constitutes a boycott for purposes of section 3(b). 82 Souter as-
serted that the majority's definition was overly narrow and
would result in a severe and unwarranted limitation on the
availability of the exception."8 The dissenters were disturbed
that under the majority's view, insurers could easily escape a
boycott claim by simply showing some marginal relationship
between the refusal to insure and the targeted transaction."
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2911.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2912.
181. Id. at 2913.
182. Id. at 2903-08.
183. Id. at 2908.
184. Id. at 2913.
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F. Pleading, Procedure and Evidence
1. Pleading
a. Pleading the Equitable Doctrine of Fraudulent Concealment
Judge Kiser in the Western District of Virginia appears to
have broken ranks with the Fourth Circuit over the require-
ments for pleading the fraudulent concealment doctrine." In
Commonwealth v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc.," Virginia al-
leged that two southwestern Virginia dairies conspired to rig
bids to local school districts in the mid-1980s. 87 Anticipating
defendants' assertion of the bar of the four year statute of limi-
tations, plaintiffs affirmatively pled that defendants' fraudulent
concealment tolled the statute."m Defendants moved to dismiss
the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),
12(b)(6) and 12(f) on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to plead
their allegations of fraudulent concealment with specificity.'89
Judge Kiser denied defendants' motions, holding that, as the
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) which must be pled and proven by
defendants, and plaintiffs are subject only to the notice plead-
ing requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), it was
not necessary for plaintiffs to plead the fraudulent concealment
exception in their complaint." Moreover, Judge Kiser held
that fraudulent concealment need not be pled with particularity
185. The fraudulent concealment doctrine is a judicially created equitable doctrine
which, if applicable, tolls the statute of limitations. To toll the statute, a claimant
must show: "(1) The party pleading the statute fraudulently concealed facts which are
the basis of a claim and that (2) the claimant failed to discover those facts within
the statutory period despite (3) the exercise of due diligence." Pocahontas Supreme
Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 218 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Char-
lotte Telecasters v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570, 574 (4th Cir. 1976);
Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552, 555 (4th Cir. 1974).
186. No. 93-0276-R, 1993 WL 476633, (W.D. Va. Aug. 19, 1993) (unpublished).
187. Details of the allegations were reported in the 1993 Antitrust Law Survey.
See Michael F. Urbanski & Francis H. Casola, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Anti-
trust and Trade Regulation Law, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 575, 605 (1993).
188. Meadow Gold Dairies, No. 93-0276-R, 1993 WL 476632, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug.
19, 1993).
189. Id.
190. Id. at *2.
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)19 as the Fourth
Circuit appears to suggest in Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v.
Bethlehem Steel," Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot
Corp.193 and Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co." Judge Kiser
distinguished each of these cases on the ground that, although
they use the word "plead," each were decided on summary judg-
ment after the introduction of evidence.'95
b. Pleading Section 1 and Section 2 Claims
Historically, antitrust plaintiffs have been more successful at
the pleading stage than on summary judgment, and the cases
decided this year were no exception. Plaintiffs' success, howev-
er, was limited, with the Fourth Circuit affirming one dismissal
and a district court denying another.
In Estate Construction Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co."
the Fourth Circuit found that a real estate developer's allega-
tions of restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
were insufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss.197 Maureen and Robert Patterson, real estate developers
and sole stockholders of Estate Construction Co., purchased
property in Fauquier County, Virginia and obtained a $7.5
million construction loan.' The loan was secured by the
property from Providence Savings and Loan, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Miller & Smith, a holding company which owned
numerous companies involved in real estate acquisitions, financ-
ing, development and sales.'" The Pattersons subsequently
defaulted on the loan and filed for Chapter Eleven bankrupt-
191. Id.
192. 828 F.2d 211, 218 (4th Cir. 1987).
193. 546 F.2d 570, 574 (4th Cir. 1976).
194. 498 F.2d 552, 555 (4th Cir. 1974).
195. Commonwealth v. Meadow Gold Dairies, No. 93-0276-R, 1993 WL 476632, at
*2. Judge Kiser came to the same conclusion in the related case Supermarket of
Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., Civil Action No. 93-0968-R (W.D. Va.
July 11, 1994), holding that the issue of fraudulent concealment is more properly
addressed on summary judgment.
196. 14 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 1994).
197. Id. at 221.
198. Id. at 215-16.
199. Id.
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cy.Y After the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay, the
property was sold to Providence at a foreclosure auction. 01
The Pattersons subsequently filed this suit against Providence
and some twenty-six other entities and individuals alleging
violations of Section 1 and Virginia's fraudulent conveyance
statute.2" It was dismissed, however, for failure to state a
claim.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal.2 °
The court found the Patterson's complaint deficient for failing
to allege both all the necessary legal elements of the claims
asserted and an adequate factual basis to support them. 5
The court held that the complaint was factually inadequate
because the allegations of conspiracy were set forth in
conclusory terms.' The court explained that when alleging a
conspiracy, the complaint must "provide, whenever possible,
some details of the time, place and alleged effect of the conspir-
acy; it is not enough merely to state that a conspiracy has
taken place." 7
The Pattersons' complaint also failed to sufficiently plead
that defendants' conduct restrained trade. 2a They did not al-
lege that defendants had market power sufficient to restrain
trade; they only alleged, in conclusory fashion, that defendants
"conspired... to restrain trade unreasonably."2" Moreover,
the Pattersons failed to make any allegation that defendants'
conduct occurred in or had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.210 Because the Pattersons "merely reiterate[d] me-
chanically the words of the Sherman Act without providing any
'sufficient facts so that each element of the alleged antitrust
violation can be identified,'" dismissal was appropriate.21'
200. Id. at 216.
201. Id. at 216-17.
202. Id. at 217.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 222.
205. Id. at 221.
206. Id. at 221-22.
207. Id. at 221 (quoting National Constructors Ass'n v. National Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 510, 528 (D. Md. 1980)).
208. Id. at 222.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting Municipal Util. Bd. v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1501
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The district court, however, in Higgins v. Medical College of
Hampton Roads," held that plaintiffs sufficiently pled claims
under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.218 There, plain-
tiffs, faculty member physicians at Eastern Virginia Medical
School (EVMS) and part of its Department of Radiation and
Oncology, sued EVMS and the Medical College of Hampton
Roads. Plaintiffs alleged that EVMS and the Medical College
prevented them from concluding a contract with Maryview
Medical Center under which they would replace EVMS as the
exclusive providers of radiation oncology services at
Maryview.214 Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendants'
exclusive contract with Maryview unreasonably restrained trade
in violation of Section 1 and allowed defendants to monopolize
the relevant markets in violation of Section 2.15 Plaintiffs
sought damages and injunctive relief to prohibit defendants
from providing radiation oncology services at Maryview."' De-
fendants moved to dismiss these claims for lack of standing,
"unclean hands," failure to state a claim under Section 1 and
failure to state a claim under Section 2.2"7
The district court denied each of defendants' motions.18
With respect to standing, the court held that plaintiffs' breach
of loyalty to EVMS in negotiating with Maryview, while enough
to bar a claim for tortious interference, did not bar plaintiffs'
antitrust claims because those claims arose out of an exclusive
contract which continued to exist after plaintiffs ended their
employment with defendants.219 Moreover, the court held that
plaintiffs' "unclean hands" caused by their breach of loyalty did
not bar their claims for injunctive relief because the defense of
in pari delicto is unavailable in antitrust cases.2 The court
(11th Cir. 1991)).
212. 849 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Va. 1994).
213. Id. at 1121-22.
214. Id. at 1115-16.
215. Id. at 1119.
216. Id. at 1116.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1123.
219. Id. at 1119-20.
220. Id. at 1120-21. For this proposition, the court relied on Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), overruled on other grounds by
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), and Chrysler
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 596 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1984). The court was unper-
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also denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 1
claim, holding that plaintiffs were entitled to an opportunity to
prove that the exclusive contract between Maryview and defen-
dants constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade."' Like-
wise, plaintiffs' Section 2 claim also survived even though plain-
tiffs had not specifically pled defendants' market power.' The
court held that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that defen-
dants possessed monopoly power and that precise quantification
of that power could wait until the parties concluded discov-
ery.M
s
2. Procedure-Class Action Certification and Sherman Act
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
In Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown,' the Supreme Court
refused to consider issues of class certification arising from an
FTC enforcement action. The Court originally granted certiorari,
but in this per curiam decision dismissed the writ as improvi-
dently granted.' The Court believed that deciding this case
would require the Court to decide a hypothetical question.'
The case has a complex history originating in an enforcement
proceeding brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
against six title insurance companies.' That action alleged
that the six companies conspired to fix prices in thirteen
states.' Shortly thereafter, private parties in twelve of those
states filed separate antitrust class actions which were consoli-
dated pursuant to the federal multi-district litigation statute as
MDL No. 633.' These class action suits sought both treble
damages and injunctive relief.' °
suaded by defendants' attempt to distinguish Perma Life on the grounds that Perma
Life involved a treble damages action whereas plaintiffs in the instant case were
seeking injunctive relief. 849 F. Supp. at 1120-21.
221. 849 F. Supp. at 1122.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994).
225. Id. at 1362.
226. Id.
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In January 1986, the class representatives in lVEDL No. 633
and the title insurance companies reached a settlement that
provided the class members injunctive relief, payment of
attorney's fees and costs, and increased amounts of coverage on
specified title insurance policies."' The district court provi-
sionally certified the settlement class under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and (b)(2),12 which do not provide an
opportunity for class members to opt out of the settlement.m
The states of Wisconsin and Arizona, both as class members
and as parens patriae for resident members of the class, object-
ed to the proposed settlement, claiming that due process man-
dated that members of the proposed class must have an oppor-
tunity to opt out of the class.' The state of Wisconsin further
objected that, because the original complaint sought monetary
damages, the class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2),
since the rule is limited to injunctive and equitable relief.'
The district court rejected the objections of Arizona and Wiscon-
sin, approved the settlement and certified the classes under
Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2). 6 The Third Circuit affirmed, and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari." '
In 1990, Brown filed this suit on behalf of consumers of title
insurance in Arizona and Wisconsin, alleging that the same six
title insurance companies conspired to fix the rates for title
search services in those states.' The district court granted
231. Id. at 1360-61 (discussing the settlement in In re Real Estate Title & Settle-
ment Services Antitrust Litigation, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 67,149 (E.D. Pa.
1986)).
232. Id. at 1361. According to the Court:
[c]ertification under Rule 23(bX1XA) requires that the prosecution of sepa-
rate actions would create a risk of "inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class." Cer-
tification under Rule 23(bX2) requires that "the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declar-
atory relief with respect to the class as a whole."
Id. at 1361 n.*.
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summary judgment for the companies because, inter alia, the
customers were parties to the MDL No. 633 suit and were
bound by that judgmentY9 The Ninth Circuit reversed, find-
ing that due process would be violated if the doctrine of res
judicata was applied to a judgment in a class action suit when
the claims sought money damages and the plaintiff in the prior
suit was not given an opportunity to opt out of those
claims.' The single issue on which the Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari was "[w]hether a federal court may refuse to en-
force a prior federal class action judgment, properly certified
under Rule 23, on the grounds that absent class members have
a constitutional due process right to opt out of any class action
that asserts monetary claims on their behalf.""
The Supreme Court's per curiam decision dismissing the writ
and allowing the Ninth Circuit's decision to stand held that it
is not important whether absent class members have a constitu-
tional right to opt out as long as that right exists under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Class members would
have such a right, the Court noted, "if, in actions seeking mon-
etary damages, classes can be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3),
which permits opt-out, and not under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2),
which do not."' The Court held that the MDL No. 633 litiga-
tion, even if incorrectly decided, conclusively determined that
the title insurance customers' class fit within a non-opt-out
provision of Rule 23.' Res judicata, therefore, prohibited the
Court from "using the Federal Rules instead of the Constitution
as the means of imposing an opt-out requirement" for the prior
settlement.' The Court declined to answer the question of
whether an opt-out right is constitutionally required in class
actions asserting monetary damages because it was a "hypothet-
ical question" as to all class members in actions other than the
present one. 6 Further, the Court stated that resolution of the
constitutional question might be unnecessary in law and in fact,
239. Id.





245. Id. at 1362.
246. Id.
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due to a proposed settlement between the parties pending be-
fore the district court.'
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented because they were concerned that the Court's decision
would allow litigants in class action suits certified under Rules
23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) to return to federal court and relitigate
their claims against the original defendants if the claims in-
volved monetary damages.' The dissenters disagreed with
the majority that it was unnecessary to resolve the constitution-
al question, believing that "[t]he resolution of a constitutional
issue with such broad-ranging consequences is both necessary
and appropriate." 9
On another procedural matter, the Supreme Court recently
addressed the issue of the extraterritorial applicability of the
federal antitrust laws. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Cali-
fornia," the Court ruled that concerns over international co-
mity did not prevent the application of Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion over foreign reinsurers."' In Hartford Fire, four domestic
insurers allegedly conspired with domestic and London based
reinsurers to boycott primary insurers to restrict terms of cover-
age for commercial general liability (CGL) insurance in the
United States. 2 The Court determined that, since the alleged
foreign conduct was "meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect" in the United States, the Sherman Act
applied.' The intentions of the foreign companies to influence
commerce in the United States encouraged the application of
antitrust jurisdiction over these companies.' The Court noted
that, when foreign law and the law of the United States are
not in conflict, international comity does not prevent jurisdic-
tion.' Conflict only exists when one cannot comply with the
law of one country without violating the law of another."
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1363.
249. Id.
250. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
251. Id. at 2908-10.
252. Id. at 2895.
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The Court therefore held that because compliance with both the
laws of the United States and Great Britain was not impossi-
ble, international comity did not prevent the exercise of juris-
diction. ' Justice Scalia, leading the dissenters, adamantly
disagreed with the majority's "breathtakingly broad proposi-
tion," arguing that it "will bring the Sherman Act and other
laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate
interests of other countries."'
3. Evidence
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp." after excluding the hearsay testi-
mony of Lifschultz's two key witnesses.' The district court
ruled this testimony inadmissible under the co-conspirator ex-
ception to the hearsay rule found in Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) because Lifschultz had not presented sufficient
credible evidence of a conspiracy to qualify for the co-conspir-
ator exception."' To qualify as non-hearsay under Rule
801(d)(2)(E), the proffering party must demonstrate the
existence of a conspiracy and that the statements were made in
the course of and in furtherance of that conspiracy. 2 In
making that assessment, the court is free to consider all the
evidence, including the hearsay statements.' Lifschultz still
failed, however, to show the existence of a conspiracy by a
preponderance of the evidence, and defendant's motion to ex-
clude the evidence was properly granted.'
257. Id. at 2910-11.
258. Id. at 2921.
259. 998 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1993), affg per curiam, 805 F. Supp. 1277 (D.S.C.
1992).
260. Id.
261. 805 F. Supp. at 1284.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 805 F. Supp. at 1284.
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III. STATE COURT CIVIL ACTIONS
Phoenix Medical Electronics Service, Inc. v. Picker Interna-
tional, Inc.,' was the only case decided by the state courts in
1993-94 which touched on antitrust issues. In a case of first
impression in Virginia, a Fairfax County circuit court judge
held that a state court could exercise jurisdiction over a suit for
tortious interference when the predicate basis of that tort claim
was an alleged violation of federal antitrust law. Phoenix filed
suit against Picker for tortious interference with its contracts
and prospective business relations. Phoenix alleged that Picker
tortiously interfered by engaging in "improper methods" which
constituted various unfair trade practices, as well as violations
of federal and state antitrust laws. Picker moved in limine "to
exclude from the case, prohibit discovery on and suppress evi-
dence" of the alleged violations of the federal and state anti-
trust laws.2"
Denying the motion, the circuit court ruled that the federal
antitrust laws, which confer exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
judiciary over federal antitrust claims, do not preclude state
courts from exercising jurisdiction over Phoenix's state law
interference claim because proof of an element of that claim
required proof of an alleged federal antitrust violation."7 The
court was persuaded by the reasoning in Caraway v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 268 which held that "[ilt is unreasonable to maintain
that the antitrust statutes were intended to exclude persons
who had common-law rights, arising from something also for-
bidden or declared to be unlawful by the acts, from pursuing
their remedies in a proper jurisdiction." 9 In any event, while
the court was skeptical that Phoenix could prove a state anti-
trust violation because interstate business activity was at issue,
265. Law No. 120599, VLW # 094-8-026 (Fairfax County Cir. Ct., Nov. 11, 1993).
266. Id. at 1.
267. Id. at 5.
268. 148 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Mo. 1957). For other conflicting federal court cases on
the issue see Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 55 F.2d 712, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1931);
Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 84 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1936); and Guiterman v.
Pennsylvania Ry. Co. 48 F.2d 851, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1931).
269. Phoenix, Law No. 120599, VLW #094-8-026, at 7 (quoting Caraway v. Ford
Motor Co., 148 F. Supp. 776, 776-77 (W.D. Mo. 1957)).
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it would only decide the issue on summary judgment, not by a
motion in limine. 0
Finally, the court rejected Picker's request that the motion in
limine be granted on a discretionary basis because Phoenix's
allegations would require the conduct of an antitrust trial with-
in the scope of the trial of the interference claim. Pointing to
legal malpractice cases, the court noted that "[i]t is not uncom-
mon for the litigation of one claim to involve the litigation of
predicate facts constituting another .... "21
IV. FEDERAL REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS
In September, 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission announced six antitrust enforcement
policies regarding mergers and various joint activities in the
health care area. 2 The policy statements are intended to pro-
vide health care providers certain "antitrust safety zones" by
describing the circumstances under which the federal govern-
ment will not challenge certain conduct under the antitrust
laws. 3
The "antitrust safety zones" announced in the policies are:
1. Hospital Mergers-where one hospital has fewer than 100
beds, and an average of less than 40 inpatients a day, and is
five years or older.'
2. Hospital Joint Ventures Involving High-Tech Equip-
ment-as long as they involve only the number of hospitals
needed to support the equipment. If additional hospitals are in-
volved, the venture will not be challenged if those hospitals
270. Id. at 9.
271. Id. at 11.
272. See Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in the Health Care Area,
issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on Sept.
15, 1993. At the time this article went to printing, the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission were expected to issue revised statements.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 4-5.
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could not support the equipment on their own or through a
competing joint venture.275
3. Physicians' Collective Provision of Underlying Medical
Data-that may improve purchasers' resolution of issues relat-
ing to the mode, quality, or efficiency of treatment.275
4. The Exchange of Data Among Hospitals Through Sur-
veys-where the data involves prices for hospital services and
wages, salaries or benefits of hospital personnel, as long as the
survey is managed by a third party, the data provided is more
than three months old, and certain precautions are taken to
aggregate the information collected so that recipients cannot
identify the data attributable to any particular hospital."
5. Joint Purchasing Among Health Care Providers-if the
purchases are for less than thirty-five percent of the total mar-
ket for the purchased item, and the cost of the items purchased
accounts for less than twenty percent of the total revenues of
each purchaser. 78
6. Physician Network Joint Ventures-as long as they are
comprised of twenty percent or less of the physicians in each
specialty who practice in the relevant geographic market, and
the physicians share substantial financial risk.279
In the only reported case this past year concerning federal
antitrust enforcement in Virginia, Judge Doumar rejected Alle-
gheny Bottling Company's attempt to overturn its 1988 convic-
tion and $1 million fine for price-fixing softdrink products with
Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola.Y Alleco, Allegheny Bottling's former
parent which had paid Allegheny Bottling's fine pursuant to an
indemnity agreement, made the abortive attempt." Alleco
sought a writ of coram nobis, alleging that the conviction re-
sulted from violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
275. Id. at 9.
276. Id. at 18-19.
277. Id. at 23.
278. Id. at 28.
279. Id. at 34.
280. United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 854 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1994).
281. Id. at 432.
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which occurred when co-defense counsel improperly communi-
cated defense strategy to government prosecutors. s 2
Judge Doumar held that Alleco did not have standing to
pursue the relief sought because, although it would benefit from
a favorable ruling, Alleco no longer had an interest in Alleghe-
ny Bottling and Alleco was "not within the narrow zone of
interests protected by the extraordinary power of a writ of co-
ram nobis."' Moreover, Judge Doumar noted that he would
not grant the writ even if it were available because the alleged
misconduct would not have saved the corporation from a finding
of guilt, since the conspiracy "permeated the entire fabric of the
corporation .... "'
V. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA
The Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section of the Virgin-
ia Attorney General's Office was more active in Virginia than
federal enforcement agencies this past year in obtaining results
that directly affected Virginia consumers. It settled a bid-rig-
ging suit brought against several southwestern Virginia dairies,
a resale price maintenance action brought against a sneaker
manufacturer, and a monopolization claim brought against
several large cable operators.
The Commonwealth brought the bid-rigging case against
Meadow Gold Diaries and Valley Rich Dairy on its own behalf
and on behalf of ten school boards in southwestern Virginia,
alleging civil violations of federal and state antitrust laws oc-
curring in the mid-1980s.' The Commonwealth settled with
Valley Rich, the dairy alleged to have received the greater
share of the alleged conspiracy's contracts, for $422,500, and
with Meadow Gold for $325,000. The ten school systems shared
the settlement proceeds. In settling the lawsuit, neither Valley
Rich nor Meadow Gold admitted any wrongdoing.'
282. Id. at 433.
283. Id. at 435.
284. Id.
285. Commonwealth v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., No. 93-0276-R (W.D. Va. Mar.
15, 1994).
286. Id. (Order of Dismissal for Valley Rich Dairy) and (W.D. Va. Mar. 28, 1994)
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In other enforcement activity, Virginia, along with forty-nine
other states and the District of Columbia, also filed suit against
Keds Corp., alleging an illegal resale price maintenance scheme
involving the sale of over five million pairs of six styles of
women's sneakers. 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the conspiracy
ran from September 1, 1992, to February 28, 1993, and resulted
in overcharges averaging between $1.00-$1.25 per pair.'
Filed simultaneously with the complaint was a settlement
agreement calling for Keds to pay a total of $7.2 million, with
$5.7 million and $1.5 million allocated to damages and
attorneys' fees, respectively. Of that amount, Virginia received
$140,443 in damages and $2,000 in attorneys' fees. Because of
the difficulty locating the purchasers of the affected shoes and
because the costs associated with distributing small amounts of
money would far exceed the amount of the payment, the settle-
ment proceeds were distributed to charities that benefit the
class of purchasers affected by the alleged price-fixing scheme,
in this case women between the ages of 15 and 44. The settle-
ment also includes an injunction barring Keds from setting
resale prices for its products or from terminating any dealer for
independently setting its retail prices for Keds productsY9
Finally, as the result of a three year multistate investigation
of the cable industry, the Attorney General's Office also filed
actions, along with forty-four other states and the District of
Columbia, against several of the largest cable operators in the
nation, including, among others, Comcast Corp., Continental
Cablevision, Inc., Cox Enterprises, Inc., Tele-Communications,
Inc., Time Warner, Inc., and Viacom, Inc., along with their
direct broadcast satellite joint venture PrimeStar Partners, L.P.
Proposed settlement agreements were filed simultaneously with
the complaints.'
The states alleged that the cable operators violated state and
federal antitrust laws by conspiring to monopolize and restrain
(Order of Dismissal for Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc.).




290. Commonwealth v. PrimeStar Partners L.P., No. 93 Civ. 3905 (S.D.N.Y. filed
June 9, 1993).
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trade through their control of programming and its distribution,
and maintained their monopoly power by denying competitors
access to programming, either directly by refusing to sell the
programming services they control to non-cable competitors, or
indirectly by coercing independent programmers not to deal or
deal only on discriminatory terms with non-cable firms. The
states also alleged that the cable operators forced programmers
to make the cable operators the exclusive distributors of pro-
gramming to technologies that were potential competitors of
cable, allowing them to increase the programming costs to the
alternative technologies. The states further alleged that the
cable operators acquired control of the only satellite currently
providing multichannel programming directly to consumers, and
then allegedly agreed not to offer programming through the
satellite that competes with the programming they offered
through cable."9
The settlement agreement with PrimeStar partners, among
other things:
(1) mandates that the programming services controlled by
the PrimeStar companies be made available to non-cable com-
petitors on reasonable terms;
(2) prohibits the PrimeStar companies as cable operators
from retaliating against "independent" programmers who wish
to sell to competitive technologies; and
(3) prohibits the PrimeStar companies from entering into
exclusive distribution agreements with existing programmers
and restricts their ability to enter into exclusives with new
programming services. 2
A separate settlement agreement was reached with Liberty
Media Corporation, a programming spin-off of Tele-Communica-
tions, Inc. Liberty is required to make its programming avail-
able to non-cable distributors on non-discriminatory terms.
Following a hearing on September 3, 1993, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York approved
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. VI. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATVE ACTIVITY
A. Federal Legislation
The National Cooperative Production Amendments' is the
first major antitrust bill to pass Congress since 1990" 5 and
the only antitrust legislation to be enacted in the past year.
This legislation is intended to reduce the likelihood of antitrust
suits against companies participating in joint ventures when
they follow the procedures in the statute.' Hopes are that
the legislation will encourage joint ventures which will, accord-
ing to President Clinton, "increase efficiency, facilitate entry
into the markets, and create new productive capacity" 7 for
the companies involved and the U.S. economy.
Under this statute, manufacturers are given the opportunity
to file their intentions to join ventures with the enforcement
agencies who then publish notice in the Federal RegisterY
These ventures are investigated by the agencies and evaluated
under a rule of reason analysis.' Co-ventures qualify for re-
duced exposure to antitrust attack once they notify the Justice
Department and the FTC." ° Such co-ventures are exposed on-
ly to liability for actual, not treble damages. "' To receive fa-
vorable treatment, the principal production facilities must be
located in the U.S. and the parties must be U.S. companies or
companies from nations which treat U.S. companies fairly un-
der their antitrust laws regarding joint ventures."' 2
B. State Legislation
The Virginia General Assembly did not pass any significant
antitrust legislation this past year.
294. Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06).
295. 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 688.2 (June 10, 1993).
296. Pub. L. No. 103-42, § 2(aX3), 107 Stat. 117 (1993).
297. 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 688.2 (June 10, 1993).
298. 15 U.S.C. § 4305 (1994).
299. Id. § 4302 (1994).
300. Id. § 4304 (1994).
301. Id.
302. Id. § 4306 (1994).
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VH. CONCLUSION
Only three reported cases substantially affected antitrust
jurisprudence this past year. The Supreme Court decided two:
one limiting the boycott exception to McCarran-Ferguson Act
immunity, and the other defining the practical limits of Robin-
son-Patman Act predatory pricing claims arising in an
oligopolistic setting. The third decision came from Judge Turk
in Advanced Health-Care where he rejected monopoly leveraging
as a valid cause of action under the Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. However, the Fourth Circuit has once again done little to
develop antitrust law. In the past few years, the majority of the
Fourth Circuit's antitrust cases have been unpublished, and
this last year, two of its three decisions were per curiam. Fed-
eral enforcement agencies, however, in an effort to avoid dis-
couraging procompetitive conduct in the health care industry,
established "antitrust safety zones" where the federal govern-
ment will not challenge certain conduct under the antitrust
laws.
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